### Weaponizing BGP Using Communities

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### BGP, the Border Gateway Protocol

### Core Protocol to Propagate <u>Reachability of IP Prefixes</u>

### Designed on Serviettes in 1994

### Yes, Really


#### An IP Prefix

#### 147.28.0.0/16


2018.11.28 Weaponizing BGP

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
### Autonomous System (AS) An ISP or End Site




#### Customers An ISP or End Site





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#### **Traffic Flows Toward Announcement**








### This Was Not Complex Enough

### Operators Wanted Signaling on Top of Signaling

### Add BGP Communities



### Syntax AS#:number

# But AS# May really be Anything

### And :number

### May really Mean Anything

#### **Undefined Semantics**

We have a syntax, AS:<blarg>


## But there are no formal semantics, just convention and common practice


# We're putting semantics in comments i = 0; /\* i = 42 \*/

### Flavors, We Think

- Active
  - Path prepending
  - Modify local preference
  - Remote triggered blackholing
  - Selective announcements
- Passive
  - Location Tagging
  - RTT Tagging

And then anything a thousand kiddies have invented






### Propagation


- RFC 1997: Communities are a transitive optional attribute
- RFC 7454: Scrub own, forward foreign communities
- So many people do not expect them to propagate that widely
- I, for one, did not


### Only 14% of Transit ASs propagate communities








- 14% seems small, but the AS graph is highly connected
- More than 50% of communities traverse more than four ASes
- 10% of communities have a hop count of more than six ASes
- Longest community propagation observed: through 11 ASes





















2 and 3 are On Path

#### On/Off Path 3 p 3:666 2 1 3:666 3:666 4 2 and 3 are On Path

#### **On/Off** Path 3 p 3:666 2 1 3:666 3:666 2 and 3 are On Path 4 is Off Path

### **Observed** Communities



## And We Have No Idea What Almost All of Them Mean

## The Internet is an Experimental Hack

### So Let's Break Things!

### Method to our Madness

- All experiments first tested in Lab
- Impacts were estimated
- Validated on the Internet, with operators' consent, e.g. for hijacks

#### RTBH

# One of the Very Few Defined Communities


#### RTBH

### Remotely Triggered Black Hole Community


### Target-AS:666 Attached to a Prefix


### A DoS Defense

# Signaling that Traffic to a Prefix be Dropped



### Ask AS 2 to Black Hole






### Safeguards, in Theory

- Provider should check customer prefix before accepting RTBH
- Customer may only blackhole own prefixes
- Different policies for Customers/Peers
- On receiving RTBH, do not propagate

# Which Looks Very Cool

### Except it is an Attack Vector






### The Attack Works Well


- Works from a distance and is hard to spot
- Triggering RTBH is possible for attackers because, e.g.,:
  - BH prefix is more specific, thus accepted via exception
  - Providers check BH community before prefix filters (bug in NANOG recipe)
  - No validation for origin of community is possible


### Off-Path Attacks





### Traffic Steering


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
























## But Is That Realistic?

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#### https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-dns-hijackstarget-payment-systems/

"BGP hijacks made use of BGP communities to shape route propagation. Although they also changed origins, which was the giveaway."

### It's the Cloud, Man

- ASN value ambiguous: who is "sender", "recipient"
- No defined semantics, values can mean anything
- Used both for signaling and triggering of actions
- No cryptographic protection
- Attribution is impossible
- It is hard to apply filters or understand what is going on

#### I Read it on the Internet

- Communities can be modified, added, removed by every AS
- No attribution is possible
- No cryptographic protection
- Yet operators bet on their 'correctness'
- Large communities partially improve the situation

Don't Propagate Without Thinking Very Deeply

- On Input Drop anything not addressed to you, unless special agreement
- On Output Drop everything except signals from you to the direct peer
- And Beware Cisco 'mis-feature' re well known communities

#### draft-ietf-grow-wkc-behavior-00

# Design on a Serviette Die by Serviette

